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ABSTRACT—People acquire property rights in objects and real estate in
order to capture the stream of services that these assets can provide over time.
The thing or parcel itself is merely a delivery mechanism, a way of packaging
and protecting rights to that value stream. And, significantly, these assets
cannot stream services to anyone without a set of facilitating conditions and
complementary goods, such as public infrastructure, that do not lie within
the asset owner’s individual control. This Essay argues that we can gain fresh
traction on inequality by recasting property as service streams rather than as
owned things. Doing so emphasizes the costs of structuring property
entitlements in ways that monopolize or squander streams of services. It also
reveals new opportunities to repackage valuable service streams into assetlike formats to create durable and flexible claims on resources. Finally, a
focus on services directs fresh attention to what people actually want and
need from resources over time—a dynamic inquiry whose answer
encompasses the spatial and ecological services that are now of
overwhelming importance.
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INTRODUCTION
We often think of property as solid and static—an owned object or piece
of land, a thing with enduring heft and weight.1 But property’s value comes
from the services that these assets can provide—or stream—to users over
time.2 Water rights offer an especially literal illustration of this point,3 but it
is also true of all real and personal property, from books and blenders to
laptops and land.4 People seek residential services from their homes,
computing and entertainment services from their devices, and transportation
services from their cars. Things are merely delivery mechanisms, akin to a
platter or a firehose. When property rhetoric fixates on ownership of physical
assets, it mistakes the container for the content, the package for the product.
Making things stand in for streams might seem like a harmless
synecdoche or a useful mental shortcut.5 But it obscures a central truth about

1
A thing-centered understanding of property has been embraced by academics as well as laypeople.
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012); infra notes
56–58 and accompanying text (noting the appeal of conceptualizing property in terms of things).
2
I am not the first to suggest this way of understanding resources. See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, THE
ULTIMATE RESOURCE 2, at 580–81 (Princeton Univ. Press rev. ed. 1996) (“[T]he appropriate way for us
to think about extracting resources is not in physical units, pounds of copper or acres of farmland, but
rather in the services we get from these resources—the electrical transmission capacity of copper, or the
food values and gastronomic enjoyment the farmland provides.”); infra notes 14–19 and accompanying
text (citing related ideas).
3
Although water rights are allocated in different ways in different parts of the United States, the case
law recognizes that these rights are valued for the flow of benefits they provide to users. See, e.g., Eddy
v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (“[T]he right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so
much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.”); Eric R. Claeys, Property, Concepts, and Functions,
60 B.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (2019) (identifying the unifying principle that “water rights needed to be structured
as seemed likely to facilitate the beneficial use of water”).
4
Although this Essay does not directly address intellectual property, such intangible goods often
enable tangible goods, such as consumer electronics, to stream benefits.
5
For the related idea that property’s structure represents a “shortcut” designed to simplify the
information environment, see Smith, supra note 1, at 1692–94.
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property: resources can only stream services if certain complementary goods,
services, and conditions are present. Modern electronics provide obvious
examples: they have value only to the extent that producers or other
nonowners continue to pour functionality and content into them.6 But similar
points can be made about low-tech personal property and real estate as well.
For instance, the ability of urban land to stream valuable services to residents
or firms depends on local infrastructure as well as on regulatory permissions
that determine how owners can segment and structure space. As this example
suggests, access to many such complements is politically mediated.7
Focusing on the objects and parcels themselves diverts attention away from
these collective choices about complements, their distributive significance,
and the central role they play in delivering—or blocking—streams of value.
This Essay argues that we can gain fresh traction on resource inequality
by shifting from the dominant “property-as-thing-ownership”
(PATO) paradigm8 to a revised “property-as-service-streams” (PASS)
conceptualization. This shift foregrounds the fact that asset owners depend
on complements, including publicly supplied goods and services, to activate
or enhance particular service streams. Highways, for instance, make it
feasible for owners to stream residential services from more remote
locations—but often at significant social cost.9 At the same time, owners
6
See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 783, 787–802 (2019) (discussing the ways in which consumers remain dependent on
sellers after purchase for the continuing usefulness of their goods).
7
This is most clearly true in the case of publicly provided goods and services. But even the
availability of complements that are privately purchased, like electricity and internet access, depends on
regulatory and other policy choices. See Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of
Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1534–38 (2013) (reviewing BRETT M.
FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES (2012)).
8
Property theorists have extensively discussed and critiqued this paradigm. See, e.g., Thomas C.
Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69, 71–73 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (criticizing “meanings of ‘property’ in law that cling to their origin in the
thing-ownership conception”). While much academic debate centers on the relative merits of a thingownership model compared with a bundle-of-rights vision of property, the contrast I draw here focuses
not on the decomposibility of property rights but rather on the production processes for property’s
benefits. My use of PATO as a shorthand is not meant to suggest that thing-based accounts are monolithic
or simplistic. For instance, Smith’s influential theory contains a highly sophisticated and nuanced
understanding of how “things” might be defined and conceptualized. See Smith, supra note 1, at 1703.
9
See David Schleicher, How Land Use Law Impedes Transportation Innovation, in EVIDENCE AND
INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 38, 39 (Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017)
(observing that automobiles, combined with publicly funded roads, “allowed people and firms to spread
outward across a region, creating new opportunities for suburban life”); Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain
“the Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 51–53 (2006) (discussing transportation policy, including highways, as subsidies
for suburbanites); Mason Gaffney, The Synergistic City: Its Potentials, Hindrances, and Fulfillment, 3
REAL ESTATE ISSUES 36, 45 (1978) (discussing the polluting effects of sprawl and the problem of adding
open space that “has to be traversed” in central areas).
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have neither the incentive nor the ability to optimize the service streams
produced by their resources if they do not also own or control the necessary
complementary entitlements, such as the right to develop higher density
housing in an urban setting.10 By emphasizing how decisions about
complements can both embed and mask distributive choices, PASS recasts
the case for making ownership more equitable.
Reframing property in terms of streaming services also carries some
important implications for how academics and policymakers might approach
inequality. First, the PASS perspective emphasizes that property rights may
be structured in ways that squander or block streams of services. For
example, a well-located urban plot that is ideally suited for housing
continuously spouts a geyser of potential residential services, but if it is
zoned for nothing but a single-family home, only a comparative cupful of
that value may be captured. Neither the parcel owner nor the regulatory
bodies that restrict her uses bears the full opportunity cost of this
arrangement. Shifting attention from allocating ownership of the parcel to
improving its yield of services can spur creative entitlement redesign that
consolidates or coordinates control over complementary resources.
Second, understanding asset ownership as a politically contingent claim
on a stream of services highlights the converse possibility of repackaging
contingent service streams into asset-like formats to create durable and
flexible claims on resources.11 Recognizing that even the most wellestablished forms of asset ownership share precisely the same contingent
reliance on politics as any form of “new” property erases the assumed
priority of the former and enables the latter to be formulated more robustly
as property interests. The ability to toggle the framing of resource
arrangements from stream to asset and back again can be crucial to achieving
social goals in a world in which PATO carries tremendous political and
psychological clout.
10

Land use regulations strictly control housing development in many U.S. cities, preventing
landowners from responding to increased housing demand by adding supply. See, e.g., Edward Glaeser
& Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 3–5 (2018)
(discussing the costs and distributive effects of restrictions on residential development, which raise
housing prices above production costs in the most economically productive cities); Joseph Gyourko &
Raven Molloy, Regulation and Housing Supply, in 5B HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN
ECONOMICS 1289, 1294 (Gilles Duranton et al. eds., 2015) (“[R]ecent empirically oriented research
suggests that the overall efficiency losses from binding constraints on residential development could be
quite large.” (citations omitted)).
11
The idea that reliance can form around streams of benefits in a manner that resembles property
claims has a longstanding but tenuous foothold in property theory. A primary catalyst in this regard was
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For more recent takes on this theme, see,
for example, Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 621–23
(1988); and David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1868–78 (2013).
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Third, a focus on services directs attention to what people actually want
and need from resources over time—a dynamic inquiry. In the face of
expanding urbanization and environmental challenges, two categories of
services have taken on overwhelming significance: the spatial services
produced by real property within our cities,12 and the ecological services that
natural resources can provide.13 Real estate within metropolitan areas is
primarily valued not for any characteristics of the land itself, but rather for
its position relative to other uses and users. Natural resources and patterns of
land use (or nonuse) can similarly produce environmental services only when
they are present in particular combinations and at an appropriate scale. To
generate these kinds of services, and to do so in a way that is sensitive to
issues of inequality and injustice, property rights must be significantly
recalibrated away from stasis and toward flexible reconfigurability.
This Essay proceeds in two Parts. Part I presents the idea of property as
service streams that depend not just on owned assets but also on their
politically mediated complements. This reconceptualization alters how we
think about property’s distributive effects. Part II turns to some further
implications of this recharacterization for the pursuit of equity
through property.
I.

PROPERTY AS SERVICE STREAMS

The property-as-thing-ownership (PATO) view is intuitively appealing
and culturally dominant. But PATO fosters two foundational errors about
12

Spatial services, as I use the term here, refers to land’s capacity to provide people with the benefits
associated with physical proximity to other users and uses. These benefits, often termed “agglomeration
economies” or “agglomeration benefits,” include reduced transportation costs, the mutual learning and
sharing of ideas that comes from interaction, and the greater matching potential associated with thicker
labor and product markets. See, e.g., David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1515–28 (examining categories of agglomeration benefits, following a schema
developed by Alfred Marshall); see also M.A. Qadeer, The Nature of Urban Land, 40 AM. J. ECON. &
SOCIO. 165, 170–72 (1981) (observing that urban land is more appropriately characterized as “space” and
explaining how its value stems from its interdependence with complementary uses).
13
The framework of “ecosystem services” seeks to delineate and quantify the value that natural
resources can provide to people. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, In Defense of Ecosystem Services, 32 PACE ENV’T
L. REV. 306, 309 (2015) (“[T]he core theme of the ecosystem services framework is that these benefits
are valuable to humans.”). Seminal works developing this framework included NATURE’S SERVICES:
SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997); and Robert Costanza
et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997). An
influential taxonomy, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, identifies four channels through which
ecosystems benefit people, including “provisioning services” (e.g., food), “regulating services” (e.g.,
flood control), “cultural services” (e.g., recreation), and “supporting services” (which make the other
streams of services possible). See Ruhl, supra, at 309 (citing WALTER V. REID ET AL., MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS, at vi (José Sarukhán
et al. eds., 2005), https://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4GYA-BHLM]).
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property and how it works. First, it leads people to conflate the tangible
vehicles that deliver valuable services (things) with the valuable services
themselves. Second, treating things as the essence of property leads people
to ignore many of the other inputs that enable (or that could enable) those
assets to stream services.
In this Part, I discuss how the property-as-service-streams (PASS)
conceptualization addresses both of these shortfalls. Section I.A outlines the
move of treating valuable streams of services, whether realized or not, as the
true object of interest for property law and theory. Section I.B turns to the
politically contingent complements that make (or could make) these streams
of value possible, and considers what it would mean to render them—and
their distributive implications—visible.
A. Things and Streams
Thinking about resources in terms of the services they provide is not a
new idea. The literature on ecosystem services offers one set of examples.14
Likewise, scholarship on the sharing economy15 redirects attention from the
ownership of things (such as cars) to access to service streams (such as ondemand rides).16 Other scholarship makes related points. Julian Simon
observes that “[a]s economists or as consumers we are interested, not in the
resources themselves, but in the particular services that resources yield.”17
James Gibson’s theory of “affordances” likewise shifts attention from
“surfaces” and “objects” to the benefits and opportunities that resources
afford people or animals.18 And Kelvin Lancaster’s innovations in consumer
14
See supra note 13. Scholarship on ecosystem services has surged in recent decades, in law as well
as in other fields. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services,
22 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 157, 161 (2007).
15
Although the term “sharing economy” has been criticized, it is commonly used in the United States
to refer to business models, usually supported by digital platforms, that divvy up goods and services
among consumers in more fine-grained ways. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The
Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215, 216 & n.1 (2016).
16
See, e.g., Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 182–88
(2017) (discussing new models of resource access that do not rely on ownership); Kellen Zale, Sharing
Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 533–35 (2016) (noting the sharing economy’s “emphasis on
providing users with access to, rather than ownership of, property”); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Fee
Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1496 (2016) (observing that access to resources can be, and
increasingly is, accomplished through means other than traditional ownership).
17
SIMON, supra note 2, at 61. For more on Simon’s views, see Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J.
Coyne, The Economic Logic Behind the Ultimate Resource (Geo. Mason Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working
Paper No. 21-17, 2021), http://ssrn.com/a=3857155 [https://perma.cc/5547-VSSP].
18
JAMES J. GIBSON, The Theory of Affordances, in PERCEIVING, ACTING, AND KNOWING: TOWARD
AN ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 67 (Robert Shaw & John Bransford eds., 1977). For example, certain
objects afford “wielding” while others afford “trace making.” Id. at 74–75 (emphasis omitted). The
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theory involved “breaking away from the traditional approach that goods are
the direct objects of utility and, instead, supposing that it is the properties or
characteristics of the goods from which utility is derived.”19
The idea that we value things because of what they can do for us might
seem obvious and uncontroversial. Indeed, the PATO vision is fully
compatible with this observation: things feature prominently in that account
not for their own sake, but rather because people are interested in using
them.20 Where PATO differs from PASS is in the assumptions that it makes
about how the benefit streams that flow from resources are generated
and optimized.
PATO structures resource use by defining and protecting domains—
things—and delegating their management to people designated as owners.21
Owners are free to curate, cultivate, and consume services by virtue of their
control of the resource, which acts as a kind of envelope or catchment for
benefit production. The owner has the right incentives to manage what is
hers, the story runs, since she will personally enjoy (or suffer) the results.22
This framing implies that noninterference—enforced through boundary
exclusion or otherwise—is the central input that the law must supply to
induce owners to optimize their resource streams.23
The PATO model thus understates the deeply interdependent processes
through which modern property generates value. Property owners today do
affordances an object offers may depend on the presence of supporting conditions or services. For
instance, a mailbox “affords letter-mailing to a letter-writing human in a community with a postal
system.” Id. at 78.
19
Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132, 133 (1966).
20
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 1704 (observing that “the ends in property relate to people’s
interests in using things”); see also J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997) (maintaining
that “the right to property is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we
have in the use of things” (emphasis omitted)).
21
See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964 (2009) (“[P]roperty’s core is a right to
things against the world, which is a rough first cut at dealing with a wide, indefinite, and open-ended set
of problems by delegating decisions over the use of property to owners who have better information about
it.”). Although Smith makes clear that this delegation to owners is “rebuttable” and that the prerogatives
of ownership can yield to important societal interests, id. at 964–65, this caveat does not emphasize the
degree to which owners need more than their delegated sphere of control to realize streams of benefits.
22
See Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151, 162 (2012) (“Property
is like a profit-sharing plan in which 100% of the profits go to the individual profit center, or an incentive
compensation scheme in which 100% of the compensation is in stock options.”).
23
The principle of noninterference is most clearly captured by the simple “keep out” or “keep off”
command that is associated with property’s “exclusion strategy.” See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 978–79, 990 (2004). Property law does
not rely exclusively on exclusion; it also employs a “governance strategy” to address cross-boundary
impacts at a finer grain. See id. at 979–80. Nonetheless, the content of that governance is often concerned
with addressing interference with an owner’s uses, as in nuisance law. See id. at 992–93.
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not, by and large, hold isolated, self-contained pieces of property into which
they alone feed inputs and from which they alone extract outputs.24 Instead,
they own pieces of larger value-production engines that generate various
streams of services for themselves and others, and that can be fed, activated,
blocked, or diverted by the acts of many other actors.25
Urban land is a prime example. Think of a single-family home on a
large lot in a major city. Its value and the services that it can deliver to its
occupants depend not only on what the owner does (or fails to do) to maintain
the place, but also on innumerable off-parcel decisions by other public and
private actors—neighbors, local businesses, school and park districts, zoning
and transit authorities, and many more.26 This reality drives a wedge between
the owner’s individual decisions and the services that the home delivers,
which include not just shelter and privacy, but also a particular neighborhood
environment, access to a set of local public goods and services, and
proximate opportunities for work, school, transportation, shopping,
recreation, and socializing.27 The homeowner’s lack of direct personal
control over the content and value of this benefit stream, and the resulting
impact on her home’s investment value, carries important implications for
her political participation.28 Asset ownership, even when coupled with
noninterference, is insufficient to safeguard the owner’s desired stream of
residential benefits.
Where PATO concerns itself with how law defines and protects things
as containers for owners’ endeavors, PASS looks to see what benefits these
resources are streaming. This move shifts our attention from the control of
things to the production of services. It pushes us to ask questions about the
forces—both within and beyond the owner’s control—that enable or inhibit
the services the resource is now streaming or that it might be capable of
streaming. Those questions are largely suppressed in a PATO
conceptualization, in which property’s primary task is to secure owners a

24

See Gaffney, supra note 9, at 58 (“Self-containment within the city is a contradiction.”).
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 16, at 1495–96 (observing that the consumption stream associated
with rights in land “is fed and diverted by acts undertaken by many parties both on and off the parcel”).
26
See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES
25–26 (2009) (noting the degree to which a home’s meaning and value depend on off-site factors).
27
See id. at 26–30; Lee Anne Fennell, Property in Housing, 12 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 31, 34–36
(2013) (describing the components of the housing bundle).
28
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 1–18 (2001) (arguing that
the dominance of the home in homeowners’ portfolios drives their political participation, given their
inability to insure against property value loss).
25
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zone of noninterference in which to pursue their various (unspecified) ends.29
Delegating the specifics of resource use to an owner may still be a useful
strategy, but that does not make service streams a matter of societal
indifference, especially when the polity’s fingerprints are all over the taps
that determine what services resources can stream, and to whom.30
To critique PATO is not to suggest that ownership claims on resources
or objects are irrelevant. Thing ownership can be understood as a kind of
transferable subscription, good for the life of the object, to whatever services
the object is actually able to stream. The option to consume or otherwise
employ those services, which persists throughout the entire period of
ownership, strongly shapes how property is experienced by owners. Yet,
importantly, the value of this option is not entirely under the owner’s control.
Just like the value one derives from a subscription to a periodical depends on
the content that authors and editors supply over time, so too one’s actual
benefits from a given object or parcel depend on the ongoing inputs that
others provide. Ownership, by this account, amounts to an enduring stake in
as-yet-unproduced benefit streams.
Like other stakeholders, owners have an intense interest in the decisions
that help their assets generate returns for them.31 This makes ownership
political as well as personal, and makes property a matter of public law rather
than just a private law subject.32 PASS can better account for these public
and political aspects of ownership than can PATO, which conceptually
foregrounds and ring-fences the privately owned asset as if it were a selfcontained factory for producing benefits. The next Section examines the way
in which collective choices about complements—including but not limited
to noninterference—shape ownership.
B. Complements and Politics
The PATO vision focuses on the owner’s right to control objects and
assets, primarily through exclusion. Yet this exclusion-backed control can,
29

Indeed, property’s opacity is deemed to be a feature, not a bug—one that simplifies the information
environment for nonowners, who need not know what an owner is doing on her property to obey the
simple command to stay off. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property,
10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 16–18 (2009).
30
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
31
This point is perhaps most obvious in the case of homeownership, in which the value of one’s
claim is largely determined by the acts of others, and one’s stake typically represents an outsized share
of one’s personal wealth. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 28.
32
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property as the Law of Complements, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PRIVATE LAW THEORY 155, 156 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky, eds., 2020) (noting that
property is a matter of both public and private law); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning
an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 91, 134–35 (2015) (calling for greater integration of property’s
public and private law facets).
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at most, preserve the physical integrity of the object or parcel; it cannot
enable or protect the flow of services that the owner cares about. Dominion
over resources only seems to do these things if we take for granted the
provision of a set of complementary goods and services that lie outside the
owner’s individual control. These complements are often the product of
political choices with unacknowledged distributive consequences. One
category of complements—noninterference—hides in plain sight within the
structure of property rights.33 But owners also continually make affirmative
claims on their communities in order to enjoy resource streams.34
Owned assets—even quite mundane ones—rely on a batch of
complements to stream beneficial services. For example, a toaster can
provide toasting services only if there is electricity available to power it, a
stretch of countertop to support it, and a medium like bread to carry out the
toasting on.35 A bed or bedroll provides sleeping services only if one also has
access to enough real estate to situate it in a reasonably horizontal position,
an ambient noise level low enough to permit sleep, and suitable weather
protection.36 A car provides a stream of transportation services, but only if
there are roads available on which to drive it, gas stations (or charging
stations) for powering it, a place to put it when not in use, a driver with
sufficient skill to pilot it, and a regulatory regime that supports all of
this activity.
We do not think about these necessary complements if regular access
to them is a presumptive feature of the context in which one acquires a given
asset; they disappear into the background, like the air we breathe.
Nonetheless, law and policy are constantly supplying them, or the means to
obtain them. Conversely, if essential complements are persistently and
continually absent, they also disappear, preventing us from even imagining
33

See supra note 23 and accompanying text. There is no inconsistency between viewing
noninterference as a complement to asset possession and understanding it as integral to ownership itself.
As Henry Smith has observed, property rights are designed to group together complementary attributes
in the hands of an owner. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Economics of Property Law, in 2 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 148, 153 (Francesco Parisi
ed., 2017).
34
Not only must property rights be affirmatively enforced through the coercive power of the state,
their value also depends on a wide array of publicly provided goods and services. Scholars have noted
the connections between these points and tax policy. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 59–66 (1999) (examining the dependence of
property rights on taxes); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 8–10 (2002) (emphasizing the role of the tax system in constructing property rights).
35
See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 7, at 1534–38 (detailing the many interactions with commons
resources and infrastructure that a typical Wall Street trader would face in an average day, including using
electricity to make her morning toast).
36
See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 296 (1991)
(noting the need to access real property in order to carry out basic human functions, including sleeping).
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the alternatives that they might activate. PASS directs attention to missing
as well as omnipresent complements and makes manifest the expectations
that law generates with respect to them—as well as the often politically
constructed and contingent nature of those expectations.
Consider the expectations regarding the right to exclude that are central
to popular understandings of real property. Although reflexively assumed to
have a long and august lineage, the idea that ownership entails the right to
wholly exclude everyone else has little basis in historical fact.37 Exclusion
and other forms of enforced noninterference amount to political decisions to
supply what are often quite socially costly complements to an owner’s
assets.38 To assert that these are fundamental attributes of ownership merely
begs the question; the extent to which they are part of property’s standard
operating equipment is itself a political judgment. These complements may
be ones that society is justified in providing in particular contexts, but that
conclusion should not simply be assumed, nor the costs of doing so ignored.
Of course, legally enforced noninterference is only partially provided
through exclusion rights in property boundaries.39 It also takes the form of
direct restrictions on the activities of other people, including other property
owners. These limitations secure complements for certain uses that property
owners wish to undertake. Zoning, for example, transfers to the community
some of the property rights previously held by individual owners.40 It
provides a complement to, say, quiet residential living that saves private
owners the cost of self-supplying that complement by buying up large
amounts of buffer space or cutting deals with everyone within earshot,
viewshed, and smelling distance.

37
See Bethany R. Berger, Eliding Original Understanding in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,
34 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/a=3926372
[https://perma.cc/4PYL-FVK8] (referencing “the numerous and robust rights to enter private property
recognized in early American law”). The idea that property ownership entails “total exclusion,” as
William Blackstone hyperbolically put it, was not something that even Blackstone believed, as many
scholars have pointed out. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 361 (2001); Carol M. Rose, Canons
of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 602 (1998); Berger, supra, at 9–11.
38
See, e.g., HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 61 (“Property rights are costly to enforce.”);
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of Property Rights, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 1927, 1929 (2012) (emphasizing the moral hazard that may accompany public enforcement
of property rights).
39
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 23, at 979–80 (discussing “governance” as an alternative strategy
to exclusion).
40
Zoning thus creates “collective property rights” that are held by the community, rather than by
individual landowners. ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 1, 15–18 (1977).
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Such a regulatory intervention presumably grants homeowners
something that they value: the complement of peace and quiet, which allows
them to stream a certain quality of residential life. But restrictions on land
use also deprive owners of regulatory complements that would enable them
to stream more dense uses from their properties, such as a duplex or
apartment building in an area zoned for single-family homes. These
restrictions also alter the political calculus for supplying public goods that
would complement different uses. For instance, convenient and welcoming
public parks serve as complements to small dwelling units that lack yards of
their own, but because they are also substitutes for backyards that are
incorporated into owned residences, they are likely to be undersupplied in
regulatory regimes that are oriented around supporting single-family
residences on large plots of land.
Thus, claims to things often translate into political claims to the
complements that enable those assets to stream value—a fact that the PATO
view both downplays and implicitly depends upon. Because people tend to
equate possession of a resource container with a right to enjoy the stream of
benefits that the resource can produce, container possession occupies an
outsized role both in setting expectations and in creating the political will to
fulfill them. That linkage can present both difficulties and opportunities for
addressing inequality. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example,
political will coalesced around efforts (imperfect though they have been) to
keep tenants from being evicted from their homes.41
Recognizing the role that control of assets plays in generating
expectations and solidifying political power is important from two
perspectives. First, it demonstrates how access to resources can leverage
claims on the complements that enable those resources to stream benefits.
Second, it lays bare the distributive consequences of this practice and
provides a blueprint for addressing them. Channeling the power of physical
assets by putting resource containers into the hands of more people is one
approach; repackaging streams of benefits into asset-like formats is another.
Changing our understanding of entitlements to one aligned with PASS
illuminates these and other possibilities.

41
Responses included eviction moratoria and emergency rental assistance. See, e.g., Temporary Halt
in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID–19, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Sept. 4, 2020);
Emergency Rental Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/emergency-rental-assistanceprogram [https://perma.cc/4EH6-FYST]; COVID-19 and Changing Eviction Policies Around the Nation,
EVICTION LAB (Mar. 19, 2020), https://evictionlab.org/covid-eviction-policies/ [https://perma.cc/G8F3JMZZ] (collecting information on federal, state, and local policies).
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR INEQUALITY
The discussion to this point has suggested that it is both conceptually
useful and normatively significant to understand property in terms of the
services that resources provide. In this Part, I consider three implications of
the PASS reframing for addressing inequality through property law. The first
relates to the opportunity costs of blocking or squandering streams of
resource services. The second involves the relationship between streams and
assets, and the potential work that toggling between these modalities might
perform. The third speaks to the evolving and plural nature of resource
services, and the need for property systems to adapt in order to capture the
most valuable service streams.
A. Blocked and Squandered Streams
Think again of a single-family home on a large lot in a booming city.
We have already noted that the value of the residential services this property
provides depends on many decisions and conditions occurring outside of the
parcel. But another problem becomes apparent once we turn our attention to
the parcel of land itself. A well-located urban parcel could supply premium
spatial services—that is, proximity to the most productive workplaces and to
other amenities—to multiple households, not just one, if the single-family
home were replaced with multifamily housing. The spatial services
associated with this plot can be visualized as an open fire hydrant that is
gushing out a powerful stream while the owner stands by with a paper cup,
capturing a tiny share of those services with her single-family dwelling. Yet
the opportunity costs of this arrangement are never directly experienced by
anyone who has the power to alter it.42
That observation might seem surprising: after all, property’s
architecture is meant to induce the owner to optimize or suffer the
consequences. Conventionally understood, land ownership confers on
owners the right to freely choose among land uses, selecting the one that
maximizes returns. But this is an oversimplification. In nearly all sizable
cities in the United States, zoning restrictions withdraw a necessary
complement—regulatory permission—to engage in many land uses; private
covenants may further restrict the owner’s available alternatives. Beyond
that, many uses would require a larger scale of ownership than can feasibly
be assembled or a smaller scale of ownership than is possible given existing
infrastructure. For example, subdividing a large tract into many small lots

42
See James Buchanan, The Economics and Ethics of Idleness, 60 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 181, 191
(2001) (observing that “perhaps the most serious distortions in incentives are to be located in the failure
of effective decision-makers on resource use to be confronted with relevant opportunity costs”).
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might require not only regulatory approvals but also changes to streets,
sewers, or the water supply that would require the buy-in of other actors.
Even devoting one’s property to conservation may seem pointless unless
one’s holdings are large or one can coordinate with owners of other parcels
to create a contiguous habitat patch or a linear wildlife corridor.43
In short, no individual property owner can optimize her property’s
service stream on her own. For one thing, her parcel is typically just one
small part of a larger pattern of potentially complementary land uses that
would gain value in combination. Some of the services that land provides
depend on attributes and features of the land itself (habitat, shade, water) or
on its position relative to other (relatively) fixed features (a hilltop for
viewing the surrounding valley, or an ocean-view lot). But many other
services depend only on a given parcel’s spatial positioning relative to other
uses and amenities that are themselves mutually dependent on their relative
positioning. This makes a great deal of land use, especially in urban areas, a
matter of co-location.44 And co-location, by definition, depends on private or
collective decisions beyond those of the individual landowner.
Collective decisions also limit the prospects for spatial optimization on
the parcel itself. If an owner’s lot is legally restricted to single-family use,
for example, she lacks the right to develop housing at higher densities. Nor
is she typically clamoring for it in the political arena. With her single-family
home in place, she benefits from the artificial constraints on housing supply
that the government imposes when it withholds the right to develop from her
neighbors. The parties who lose out—the families who cannot locate in the
city because there is no affordable housing—are not part of the local political
picture and have no way to coordinate with each other.45
The story is a familiar one, but it is often cast as a conflict between
incumbent residents and newcomers. Yet seeing that incumbent owners
43
The value of the habitat services that conserved land can provide depends in part on its shape, size,
and contiguity. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading
Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1, 20–25 (2007); Lynne Gilbert-Norton, Ryan Wilson, John R. Stevens
& Karen H. Beard, A Meta-Analytic Review of Corridor Effectiveness, 24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 660,
667 (2010).
44
See Lee Anne Fennell, Co-Location, Co-Location, Co-Location: Land Use and Housing Priorities
Reimagined, 39 VT. L. REV. 925, 925–28 (2015); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Co-Location Covenants, U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/03/30/co-locationcovenants-by-lior-jacob-strahilevitz/ [https://perma.cc/7UV3-CD2C] (noting “the interdependence of
residential location choices” and proposing a “co-location covenant” as a mechanism for inducing
mobility in certain contexts).
45
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions Out of Thin Air: Transferable
Development Rights and “Constituency Effects” in Land Use Law, 12 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 79, 108–12
(2020) (characterizing these political dynamics as “constituency effects” and describing their impacts on
land development).
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actually lack a complementary good that could lead them to a different
conclusion about the best use of their own land—i.e., development rights—
revises this account.46 Changes in zoning laws now afoot in some
jurisdictions have made inroads into the dominance of the single-family
home not by simply allowing nearby development to be unilaterally imposed
by others, but by actually granting single-family homeowners the reciprocal
right to develop their own properties more intensively. For instance, recent
legislation in Oregon allows duplexes and certain other multifamily housing
units on lots previously zoned for single-family homes.47 Now there is an
opportunity cost for the single-family homeowner who currently captures
only a fraction of the spatial services that her lot can legally provide. The
spewing hydrant has become visible.
Owners may still have too little incentive to optimize the services their
properties generate. But, counterintuitively, some of the problems of
property inequality might be best addressed not by blaming incumbents for
their efforts in the political arena to secure complements to their existing
uses, but by granting them complements that would enable them to alter
those existing uses. A similar point has been made in the context of parking
on public streets adjacent to private property: owners might behave better in
stewarding this resource if they were granted explicit rights to control the
parking (and to benefit from renting the space to others) than when they have
only informal de facto rights that lead them to behave territorially.48
Addressing exclusionary zoning by “going big” through regional governance
that sidesteps local politics is often proposed, but another strategy would be
to “go small” by granting stakes to the landowners themselves and their
immediate neighbors.49
46

See SAMUEL HUGHES & BEN SOUTHWOOD, POL’Y EXCH., STRONG SUBURBS: ENABLING STREETS
CONTROL THEIR OWN DEVELOPMENT 23 (2021), https://policyexchange.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Strong-Suburbs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ND6-EKRR] (describing as “profoundly
mistaken” the view that “the interests of those who already own homes are fundamentally opposed to the
interests of those who do not” and ascribing this mistaken belief to “a defective system, which excludes
existing communities from the benefits of development while imposing on them its adverse effects”).
47
H.B. 2001, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Or. 2019). For analysis of the bill’s success, see
Michael Andersen, Eight Ingredients for a State-Level Zoning Reform: Lessons from Oregon’s House
Bill 2001 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP21MA2, 2021),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-papers/eight-ingredients-state-level-zoning-reform
[https://perma.cc/S663-WE6H].
48
See DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 434–40 (2005).
49
See, e.g., HUGHES & SOUTHWOOD, supra note 46, at 21 (proposing “allowing streets to agree by
supermajority on design rules to allow buildings with more storeys that use more of their plots” (emphasis
omitted)); id. at 38–61 (offering a detailed version of this proposal); JOHN MYERS, HYPERLOCAL ZONING:
ENABLING GROWTH BY BLOCK AND BY STREET 5 (2021), https://www.manhattaninstitute.org/hyperlocal-zoning-enabling-growth-block-and-street [https://perma.cc/LYL7-6FAS] (“If
TO
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Solving the problem of blocked and squandered resource service
streams requires more than aligning incentives to develop individual plots of
land. The ability of resources to stream useful services depends on how those
resources are combined and configured at larger scales. For instance, making
the most of an urban area often requires assembling complementary uses at
the block, neighborhood, or community level. Legal restrictions are not the
only obstacles in the picture, although they are ubiquitous and highly
consequential ones. The separate private ownership stakes of multiple
landowners can also serve as an impediment to the resource services that
might be provided by a larger scale or differently configured development.50
The costs of current arrangements are not just misallocated but
effectively rendered invisible by our current framing of property rights,
which does not reflect the ongoing consumption associated with holding
property idle, or in less beneficial uses.51 A PASS reframing can make those
costs visible.52 To be clear, optimizing property service streams does not
mean using all property at maximum intensity in all contexts. The resource
services that produce the most value might be ecosystem services of various
kinds, which are best streamed by leaving land unused.53 The goal is to create
incentives to turn the land into the best service provider it can be.54

broad upzoning often fails because the area across which the decision is made encompasses enough
people who will likely not benefit from it, the solution is to allow for more localized decision making.”);
see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Land Options for Housing: How New Property Rights
Can Break Old Land Monopolies 70–72 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 22-11, 2022),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=4021239 [https://perma.cc/53AV-9TSC] (discussing proposals for localized
zoning waivers and the challenges of scaling them up). In other words, countering NIMBYism could
involve granting homeowners more, not less, control over their own (actual) backyards.
50
Such dispersed ownership structures have been associated with “anticommons” problems. See,
e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623, 667–69 (1998) (describing “anticommons property” and
discussing its origins in a “thought experiment” introduced by Frank Michelman).
51
See, e.g., Mason Gaffney, Land as a Distinctive Factor of Production, in LAND AND TAXATION
39, 86 (Nicolaus Tideman ed., 1994) (noting the consumption associated with a landowner “preempting
the time-slot from others”); Nate Ela, Property and the Problem of Disuse, 100 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 7–14), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=4066799 [https://perma.cc/BTY7-4R8Z]
(observing that property theory overlooks the problem of disuse when it treats nonuse as just another use);
see also Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent Law,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1455–68 (2013) (noting limits on and justifications for the right not to use
one’s property).
52
Such visibility can, in turn, support changes in law and norms. See Ela, supra note 51, at 33
(“Articulating the social interest in putting things to use lays a basis for the claim that it is anti-social to
leave resources disused—and that owners should be obliged not to do so.”). Notably, water rights, which
involve literal streams, can be lost through nonuse. See Liivak & Peñalver, supra note 51, at 1457–58.
53
See supra note 13.
54
Of course, what that means may change over time. See infra Section II.C.
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B. Toggling Between Solids and Streams
Reconceptualizing property in terms of the services that resources
provide—that is, adopting the PASS view—can transform how we
understand both property and inequality. But PATO retains “a grip on the
popular imagination,”55 one that is psychological and social as well as
political.56 Thing ownership resonates even with sophisticated property
scholars. Michael Heller and James Salzman, for example, worry that a move
from owning objects to streaming services will cause us to “lose touch with
our neighbors and communities” and “lose aspects of our personhood,
[including] a connection with the sacred that many people experience
through old-fashioned ownership.”57 And Henry Smith has famously
advocated viewing property as “the law of things,” pushing back against
those who would dismiss thing ownership as an overly simplistic vision
of property.58
How, then, can streaming compete with the ineffable appeal of owning
objects and even actual pieces of the world?59 What this Essay hopes to
demonstrate is that there is really no choice to be made between owning and
streaming—all human value ultimately comes down to streaming resource
services, whether or not there is an owned object in the picture. To be sure,
one way to maintain and enrich a given service stream is to hold onto the
same object for a long time so that its services are fine-tuned to one’s
specifications and always at the ready when needed. An owner of a home,
car, or kitchen appliance learns all its special quirks and features, can modify
it to suit her particular needs, and can seamlessly return to it again and again
without facing a learning curve each time. But sustained possession of a
given object is not the only way to achieve these objectives. For example,
new forms of personalization that make settings, preferences, and interfaces
55

Heller, supra note 50, at 661.
See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97–103 (1977)
(discussing thing-based lay notions of property ownership and how they are impacted by socialization);
see also STEPHANIE M. STERN & DAPHNA LEWINSOHN-ZAMIR, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PROPERTY LAW 9–
10 (2020) (discussing research on “psychological ownership”); Jon L. Pierce, Tatiana Kostova & Kurt T.
Dirks, The State of Psychological Ownership: Integrating and Extending a Century of Research, 7 REV.
GEN. PSYCH. 84, 97–100 (2003) (examining cultural influences on the psychological experience
of ownership).
57
MICHAEL HELLER & JAMES SALZMAN, MINE! HOW THE HIDDEN RULES OF OWNERSHIP CONTROL
OUR LIVES 272 (2021).
58
Smith, supra note 1, at 1691–92; Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 95, 113–17 (2014).
59
See Smith, supra note 1, at 1702 (explaining that property’s “exclusion strategy defines a chunk
of the world — a thing — under the owner’s control”); Grey, supra note 8, at 73–74 (observing that,
historically, “property conceived as the control of a piece of the material world by a single individual
meant freedom and equality of status”).
56
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portable across objects could make a durable claim on a particular thing less
necessary.60 Likewise, the ready availability of a given resource service can
be assured through pooled resources that can be tapped on demand, if
markets are thick and efficient enough to make access reliable
and seamless.61
In short, turning our attention to service streams lets us find multiple
ways to fulfill the true object of property—arranging resources to meet
human needs. Yet, what if one of those human needs is an engrained desire
to own things? The previous point, that everything comes down to service
streams, does not answer this concern. But it does suggest something very
interesting: that our ordinary understandings of property already manage to
conceptually transform service streams into what we celebrate as
“ownership.” This odd everyday alchemy allows an object or chunk of real
estate to stand in for the full set of claims required to enable the asset to
stream useful benefits. If we can make this move, then it also seems feasible
to synthesize durably ownable “things” out of service streams.62
Redescribing property as service streams demonstrates that service
streams can, and do, constitute property—traditional property no less than
“new” property.63 Ownership represents a claim on those streams that has
historically been, but need not be, anchored by permanent rights to a physical
object. That anchoring, far from being essential, obscures inequities, cost
misalignments, and waste, as the last Section detailed. Unbundling durable
claims from asset ownership, or redesigning entitlements to introduce more
fluidity into property holdings, will change what ownership means. Yet
casting these changes as consistent with rather than hostile to the idea of
ownership is not only possible but likely essential as a political matter.64 The
60
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property Beyond Exclusion, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 521, 558–60
(2019) (discussing the possibility that technology might reduce the benefits of long-term ownership for
goods like cars, and giving the example of “portable profiles that auto-adjust the seats and mirrors and
instantly reconfigure touchscreen-based controls to match our preferred arrangement”).
61
See, e.g., ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT—AND WHY 101–06 (2015) (noting the role of
transaction speed in thickening markets); Davidson & Infranca, supra note 15, at 225–32 (examining how
urban environments can facilitate more efficient matching through proximity).
62
For the malleability of property ownership perceptions and their susceptibility to framing effects,
see generally Jonathan Remy Nash & Stephanie M. Stern, Property Frames, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 449
(2010) (showing in an experimental setting that the sense of ownership of a laptop could be weakened by
switching from a “discrete-asset” frame to a “bundle-of-rights” frame and by warning participants in
advance about possible future limitations on their rights in the laptop).
63
See supra note 11.
64
Similar considerations may have influenced the way in which Henry George framed his land tax,
which he described at some points as equating to public or common ownership of land: “Let the
individuals who now hold it still retain, if they want to, possession of what they are pleased to call their
land. Let them continue to call it their land.” HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 403 (1912); see
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idea of ownership is flexible enough to extend to claims on resource streams
that lack enduring connections to specific physical objects.
Further, understanding inequality in terms of access to service streams
(rather than in terms of assets) opens up new ways of conceptualizing what
greater equality might look like and how it might be structured. For instance,
improving access to a stable flow of residential services may be a better
benchmark for success than increasing the rate of homeownership. Even so,
packaging access to services in the form of assets remains psychologically
and politically important. Thus, pursuing equity through property requires
understanding not only how access streams are currently (imperfectly)
embodied in owned assets but also how service streams might be
reconfigured into new property forms capable of being durably owned. In
other words, we need to see behind the thingness of assets to appreciate what
services they are capable of providing, without losing sight of (and while
finding ways to replicate) whatever it is that makes thing ownership seem so
compelling. We need to see the substantive equivalences that exist between
different ways of framing service claims and become adept at toggling
between them.65
Individuals are not the only ones who gravitate toward thing ownership;
governments do as well, with significant implications for social policy. A
concrete example appears in recent work by Noah Kazis examining state and
local housing assistance. Kazis observes that although the federal
government uses both project-based and tenant-based (voucher) strategies,
states and cities almost exclusively use project-based assistance.66 In his
telling, subnational governments prefer buying things (buildings) to taking
on streams of obligations (vouchers) because the former represents a
tangible, up-front commitment capable of weathering fiscal cycles.67 As he
explains, “The durability of housing allows subnational governments to

John Pullen, Henry George’s Land Reform: The Distinction Between Private Ownership and Private
Possession, 60 AM. J. ECON. & SOCIO. 547 (2001) (discussing a variety of possible interpretations of
George’s views and the potential role of politics in his choice of framing).
65
Jonathan Nash and Stephanie Stern discuss using framing to weaken a sense of ownership in order
to pave the way for socially valuable regulation. See Nash & Stern, supra note 62, at 457–59. The
discussion here makes the converse point, that casting certain service flows as owned assets can increase
the degree to which their holders, and society at large, understand them as granting durable and
enforceable claims.
66
Noah M. Kazis, The Failed Federalism of Affordable Housing: Why States Don’t Use Vouchers,
120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3, 19–28), https://ssrn.com/a=3914946
[https://perma.cc/5BKC-N4NL].
67
Id. at 36.
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smooth out, and lock in, the provision of affordable housing over the
fiscal cycle.”68
Kazis views this prioritization of project-based assistance as both a
“pathology of federalism” and “a savvy adaptation” to political realities on
the part of states.69 It also underscores the need for creativity in designing
mechanisms that would open up a larger slate of housing assistance
alternatives. Here, we might consider how to confer on households a portable
entitlement to be adequately housed that is durable, tangible, and
enforceable.70 Properly designed and framed, such an entitlement could work
exactly like a hard unit of housing in granting people access to an ongoing
stream of residential services—and committing the government to keeping
the tap open.
The role of government-supplied complements in activating all
residential service streams bears emphasis here. From tax policies like the
mortgage interest deduction, to transit and other infrastructure choices, to
development decisions that determine whether fresh food will be readily
available in a given neighborhood,71 the government influences the value of
everyone’s residential service streams. Distributive consequences flow from
innumerable hidden subsidies and political decisions that interact with
owner-occupied housing units, no less than from low-income “housing
assistance.”72 Accordingly, we should not think of the home, the font of
residential services, as limited to or exclusively defined by a specific piece
of housing stock. Instead, a useful notion of home must attend to the
demands of co-location and encompass proximate complementary uses
and amenities.
This shift in perspective suggests a radically revised understanding of
“homeownership”—one that is more inclusive, flexible, and descriptively
accurate than an ownership claim over a physical housing unit. Charles Reich
ended The New Property with a call for a “Homestead Act for rootless
twentieth century man.”73 Now well into a twenty-first century marked less

68

Id. at 37. Project-based housing is also a more visible and salient way to deliver assistance in a
world where most eligible families receive no housing assistance at all. See id. at 47 (“It is easier to notice
the new affordable housing complex than the difference between a ten-year voucher waitlist and an
eleven-year waitlist.”).
69
Id. at 6, 39.
70
See id. at 51 (“[S]tates’ current approach to rental assistance makes clear that an entitlement to
tenant-based assistance is warranted.”).
71
I thank a participant in the Symposium for a question raising this example.
72
For an overview of federal low-income housing assistance, which provides benefits to only roughly
one in four eligible families, see Robert Collinson, Ingrid Gould Ellen & Jens Ludwig, Reforming
Housing Assistance, 686 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 250, 251–53, 270 (2019).
73
Reich, supra note 11, at 787.
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by rootlessness than by undue stickiness in land uses and housing
arrangements,74 the core problems of racial and economic injustice and their
stultifying effects on human potential remain with us. Ownership,
reconceived as service streams, offers a way forward. We should strive to
become a nation of homeowners, but not in the sense usually intended by
that phrase. Instead, we should seek to become a nation of what we might
call “home rights holders”—people who own secure rights to robust
residential streams conducive to human flourishing, ones that need not
be anchored to occupant-owned pieces of real estate in fixed
geospatial locations.75
C. Changing Streams
Thinking about property in terms of the services that assets provide has
a further implication: it highlights the fact that the services people want and
need from resources can change over time. This is especially true in the case
of land, which is capable of providing a seemingly endless array of possible
services. Yet because landowners lack the complements necessary to initiate
and execute many changes in their property’s service flows, land often
remains mired in suboptimal existing uses. The resulting inertia represents a
major source of opportunity costs, which often go unacknowledged. To do
better would require not just recognizing the more valuable uses that land
might provide, but also giving those who manage the land’s services both
the right incentives and some coordinating mechanism capable of putting
together all the pieces—ownership interests, regulatory permissions, and
public goods—that are necessary to bring those more valuable uses about.
As long as property is viewed in terms of ownership of objects, these forgone
service flows are difficult to spot, much less address.
Today, two categories of resource services are especially important and
either chronically undersupplied or at continual risk of being so: the spatial
services that land can provide in urban areas, and the ecosystem services that
natural resources can provide.76 Both depend on the supply of politically
contingent complements. A model of property that fragments control over
whether these services can be provided—and, indeed, whether their absence
will even be noticed—cannot respond to our most pressing modern
74
See David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J.
78, 81–83, 114–17 (2017).
75
A new term is necessary because “homeownership,” despite its aptness, has a specific and
longstanding meaning that cannot be readily revised. Nonetheless, we could begin to use the phrasing of
“house ownership” or “housing unit ownership” to designate fee ownership of real property, leaving room
for the idea that owning rights to a home—a durable claim on residential services—need not entail owning
land or a physical structure.
76
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
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challenges. Those challenges include climate change and problems of habitat
and species loss, on the one hand, and problems of housing unaffordability,
inequality, and unremediated historic injustice, on the other. Neither set of
problems can be solved without rethinking how real property and other
natural resources deliver services.
The ecosystem services approach attempts to make clearer the
opportunity cost associated with different forms of environmental
degradation by placing the value that conservation efforts could provide on
a par with other productive activities undertaken using land and other natural
resources.77 Ecotourism offers one potential channel through which
conservation efforts might generate economic returns capable of competing
with extractive uses.78 But the idea extends more broadly. We can view
landowners as potential cultivators not only of traditional agricultural crops
like bushels of potatoes or bales of hay, but also of specific, ecologically
beneficial outputs like gallons of clean water or discrete units of
species preservation.79
Owners cannot be expected to make optimal resource choices if markets
reward them for only some of the services that their assets can produce, such
as those associated with extractive industries, and not others that are of equal
or greater societal value. One approach involves finding a way to pay people
for all of the valuable outputs that their land can produce. On the other side
of the ledger, landowners might be charged for the full costs of the resource
decisions they make.80 These approaches can be combined. For example, one
77
See, e.g., HELLER & SALZMAN, supra note 57, at 241–46 (discussing programs that pay
landowners for providing various ecological services, including clean water and habitat preservation).
78
See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 309 (listing cultural services, including recreation, as a category of
ecosystem services). Of course, there are plenty of ways that ecotourism can go awry. See, e.g., J. Edward
Taylor, George A. Dyer, Micki Stewart, Antonio Yunez-Naude & Sergio Ardila, The Economics of
Ecotourism: A Galápagos Islands Economy‐Wide Perspective, 51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE
977, 993 (2003) (observing that “tourism may create incentives either to conserve or to exploit the natural
resource base” and concluding that their “findings point to difficult trade-offs between the objectives of
preserving fragile ecosystems and insuring the participation of locals in the economic benefits of
nature tourism”).
79
See, e.g., HELLER & SALZMAN, supra note 57, at 244 (“We don’t think twice about paying for
potatoes or coal attached to land, so why not pay farmers for improved water quality?”); Donald L. Hey
& Paul G. Heltne, Thinking Like a River: A Riverine National Park for the Upper Mississippi River,
68 ECOLOGICAL ENG’G 8, 12 (2014) (describing an environmental approach called “‘nutrient farming’
because of its analogies to conventional farming: rather than growing corn or soy beans on the floodplain,
the nutrient farmer ‘grows’ native wetland biotic systems . . . ‘harvests’ nitrogen [and] phosphorous, and
detoxifies other contaminants”).
80
These are two sides of the same coin. A resource choice with unwanted impacts on others might
be framed in terms of failing to provide a positive externality, or, alternatively, in terms of generating a
negative externality. See, e.g., A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 184 (4th ed. 1932) (observing
that “resources devoted to the prevention of smoke from factory chimneys” provide an “uncompensated
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proposed approach to preservation, “nutrient farming,” would involve new
markets that could, for example, charge corn farmers for the fertilizer runoff
they produce by requiring them to purchase “nitrogen credits” from other
farmers who cultivate wetlands.81
There are some difficulties operationalizing this approach. As already
noted, there may be issues of scale that require assembling resources from
multiple owners. Moreover, the many parties who benefit from ecological
goods are typically widely dispersed and much harder to collect from than
purchasers of corn or potatoes.82 In addition to new forms of ownership
capable of recognizing compensable rights in ecological service streams,
then, we also need innovative mechanisms for harnessing collective action.
A recent example of experimentation along these lines involved the
preservation of habitat for the bobolink, a songbird whose nesting season
overlaps with the haying season of farmers.83 Because haying disrupts
nesting, with catastrophic results for the next generation of bobolinks, a
nonprofit group experimented with contracts that would pay the farmers to
delay their haying.84 The contracts were funded with different versions of
“provision-point mechanisms” in which donors made contributions that
would be returned unless they reached the threshold necessary to fund a
particular contract with a given farmer.85
The underprovision of spatial services in urban areas is a problem that
is easier to solve in some ways and more difficult in others. Once landowners
possess the right to develop their properties at higher densities, or to sell them
to developers who will do so, market incentives should spur development in
places where demand for scarce urban space exceeds supply. But obtaining
the necessary rights to carry out this densification can be quite challenging,
service[],” while the smoke itself “inflicts a heavy uncharged loss on the community”). Whether actors
are paid for positive externalities, charged for negative ones, or some combination of the two, the goal is
to make the differences in private payoffs track the differences in social payoffs. See id. at 183–203.
81
See Donald L. Hey, Laura S. Urban & Jill A. Kostel, Nutrient Farming: The Business of
Environmental Management, 24 ECOLOGICAL ENG’G 279, 284–85 (2005).
82
Put another way, because ecological services are public goods, which are nonrival and
nonexcludable, they are prone to free-rider problems. See, e.g., RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER,
THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6–7 (1986) (outlining the
characteristics of public goods); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 20 (1982) (noting difficulties in
getting people to pay for goods from which they cannot be excluded).
83
See Stephen K. Swallow, Christopher M. Anderson & Emi Uchida, The Bobolink Project: Selling
Public Goods from Ecosystem Services Using Provision Point Mechanisms, 143 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
236 (2018).
84
See id. at 239, 242–45.
85
Id. at 240; see also Ian Ayres, Voluntary Taxation and Beyond: The Promise of Social-Contracting
Voting Mechanisms, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4–5 (2017) (discussing this example and other uses of
provision-point mechanisms); Julia Y. Lee, Gaining Assurances, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1137, 1147–58
(examining a variety of contingent contracting mechanisms).
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because it requires assembling the necessary regulatory complements. That,
in turn, requires overcoming the objections of other landowners who might
prefer lower density, as well as those of renters and other stakeholders who
fear neighborhood change. Complicating matters further, proposed
development often draws fire from those alleging that it will harm
environmental interests.86
Mechanisms for sharing the gains from enhanced resource service flows
can help address some of these problems.87 More foundational changes in the
nature of property holdings could do even more.88 But the problems are
genuinely difficult ones. The central point worth emphasizing, however, is
that the most valuable services that our resources are capable of providing to
us are likely to change over time. We cannot make the best use of the
resources we have unless we are in a position to both recognize those services
and marshal the forms of collective action necessary to bring them about as
conditions change. This requires an understanding of property that is nimble
and adaptive, one that is actively devoted to optimizing service streams.
How can we improve property’s adaptability to meet new challenges?
Importantly, the answer is not to hold large blocks of real property in reserve
as a precautionary measure. Not only is it impossible to know what scale of
land use will work best in the future,89 it is quite ambiguous whether larger
or smaller pieces would be more conducive to any given shift in uses. For
example, even if we knew a larger scale use would be optimal in the future,
86

For example, allegations of state environmental law violations were the basis for a recent lawsuit
against the City of Minneapolis’s new land use plan, Minneapolis 2040, which eliminates exclusively
single-family zones and permits denser development. See State ex rel. Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City
of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 584, 586–87 (Minn. 2021) (holding that the complaint’s allegations of
environmental impacts were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). Likewise, the implementation of
a state law permitting lot splitting (and hence denser development) was put on hold in Woodside,
California after concerns were raised about the impact on mountain lion habitat. See Angela Swartz,
Woodside Freezes SB 9 Projects, Citing an Exemption for Mountain Lion Habitats, ALMANAC (Feb. 2,
2022, 10:25 AM), https://www.almanacnews.com/news/2022/02/02/woodside-freezes-sb-9-projectswith-town-citing-excemption-for-mountain-lion-habitats [https://perma.cc/2ERM-2SQA]. For an
examination of the history of coalitions between homeowners and environmental groups in opposing
development, see generally William A. Fischel, The Rise of the Homevoters: How the Growth Machine
Was Subverted by OPEC and Earth Day, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY,
supra note 9, at 13.
87
See, e.g., Hills & Schleicher, supra note 45, at 108–17 (examining how transferable development
rights might be used to build coalitions supportive of new housing development); Lee Anne Fennell &
Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 152–71 (2010) (exploring ways to
adjust the stakes that homeowners and renters hold in community changes in order to better align their
incentives regarding development).
88
See generally Fennell, supra note 16 (discussing the shortcomings of fee simple ownership and
proposing new alternatives).
89
Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 99, 120–21 (2010) (noting our
inability to identify a resource’s “ideal use” in advance).
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it might be easier for that later configuration to do without a few tiny pieces
(assuming perfect contiguity is not necessary or multiple pathways are
possible) than it would be to obtain the unanimous cooperation of even a
relatively small number of landowners whose larger pieces are all
absolutely essential.90
Nonetheless, individual landowners may attempt to future-proof their
plans by amassing precautionary holdings, a kind of hoarding that spurs
others to do likewise and increases the stickiness of land markets.91 As Mason
Gaffney explains, “The composite result of individuals buying for future
contingent need is that the market in raw land is turned to glue.”92 People
rarely hoard ordinary consumption goods in this manner; rather than attempt
to create their own storehouses, people simply go to the grocery store
periodically and buy what they need as they need it.93 Yet durable goods and
real estate alike can be conceptualized as a stockpiling solution that keeps a
necessary resource continually on hand. Owning complementary goods that
are essential to one’s own production processes is a well-recognized way to
stave off hold-up problems.94 It is not surprising to see it used as a preemptive
solution to potential holdout problems relating to land assembly.
But holding land out of the market for an extended period is enormously
costly to society, because it means depriving other people, on a continuing
basis, of the opportunity to obtain essential complements to their ongoing
projects.95 And these costs, which cash out in diminished societal flexibility,
are not fully charged to the owner.96 It is a little like leaving open a spigot all
90

See Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1970–71 (2012).
See Gaffney, supra note 51, at 77 (“When anyone buys and holds for his own future expansion,
everyone has to: it is a positive feedback loop of possessiveness run wild.”).
92
Id. at 78.
93
Id. (providing the grocery store analogy). Instances of hoarding do occur occasionally in other
markets in response to particular threats or pressures that generate panic—but they are generally regarded
as anomalous and regrettable, and not the way that markets are designed to work. For additional
discussion of the problem of resource hoarding, see generally Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Change, Inequality,
and Hoarding (Feb. 13, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454913
[https://perma.cc/PL6X-L7MK].
94
See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
95
See Gaffney, supra note 51, at 78 (“Timely subdivision may be foregone in anticipation of future
assembly problems, skipping an entire generation of optimal land use.”); see also LEE ANNE FENNELL,
SLICES AND LUMPS: DIVISION AND AGGREGATION IN LAW AND LIFE 42–44 (2019) (observing that
whatever option value might come from keeping property configured in larger tracts than are currently
optimal must be weighed against the lost opportunities of doing so).
96
See T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial
Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990) (noting the costs in forgone flexibility that landowners can
impose). See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (examining
the ways in which property entitlements constrain societal flexibility, and exploring alternatives).
91
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day long to save oneself the trouble of turning the tap back on later;
meanwhile, the decreased water pressure diminishes everyone else’s ability
to derive value from the waterworks. For land to reliably stream the most
useful services to people, markets in land must themselves be fluid, keeping
enough land in enough places “on tap” to meet evolving needs.97
How can we achieve this? The answer again comes down to recognizing
the opportunity costs of present arrangements and bringing them to bear on
parties who are in a position to do something about them. Tax policy offers
one route for charging people for the costs of the decisions that they make
with regard to resources.98 Another tack would involve changes in ownership
structure and entitlement design, so that ownership does not come bundled
with perpetual veto rights over a specific physical location.99
I have written elsewhere about the ossifying effects of fee simple
ownership, which extends forward in perpetuity.100 The PASS view brings
the costs of property ossification to the foreground by emphasizing the ways
in which misconfiguration can impede service flows. Shifting from PATO
to PASS encourages an explicit recognition of property’s fluidity—its
dynamic and active quality, and its capacity to shape-shift as what we seek
from it changes. There is an important perceptual adjustment that comes
from moving from solid to liquid metaphors for property.101 Carol Rose once
asked what it would mean for property theory if water, not land, were “our
chief symbol for property.”102 Jeanne Schroeder also describes property in
fluid terms, observing that “[l]iquid property can take on the form of
whatever bottle it is poured into, and contemporary property can be
reconfigured to fill new legal functions.”103 Property, on this view, is a lively
and even slippery force that interacts continually with law and the

97
Gaffney, supra note 51, at 78 (“A good land market would . . . keep land on tap for the contingent
needs of all, greatly lowering aggregate needs.”).
98
See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 42, at 190–91 (observing that “[t]he landowner . . . impose[s] costs
on others in the economy as he withdraws land from the production of marketable value” and discussing
the role of tax policy in aligning incentives). Henry George’s land tax, in which well-used land is taxed
no more than vacant land, is one way of trying to bring the opportunity costs of underutilization to bear.
See id. at 182, 187–88; see also Gaffney, supra note 9, at 59 (“Taxing land values lubricates the market
by making it more costly to hold land in reserve.”).
99
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 16, at 1480–94 (outlining some approaches to revising the temporal
scope and geographic fixity of property rights).
100
See id. at 1468–79 (assessing the architecture of the fee simple and its failure to adapt adequately
to changing conditions).
101
See, e.g., Péter D. Szigeti, A Sketch of Ecological Property: Toward a Law of Biogeochemical
Cycles, 51 ENV’T L. 41, 48 (2021) (urging a shift to understanding property in terms of cycles and flows).
102
Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 (1996).
103
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed “Property,”
69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1340 (1996).
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environment; it is not a static chunk of the world lodged impassively in an
owner’s account.
Finding ways to support changes in resource use and scale has never
been more important. Thinking about property’s value in terms of its
capacity to stream services can help make the case for building in
reconfigurability. There is indeed something arresting about people’s
longstanding ties to their land, and something important about the ability to
stand on one’s rights and say “no” to a proposed change. But making the
costs of inflexibility visible while securing meaningful independence to
individuals through means other than perpetual control of a particular hunk
of earth will allow property to serve us—all of us—better.
CONCLUSION
How can property, a doctrinal field associated with entrenchment and
inertia, address a modern problem like inequality? This Essay has suggested
that reconceiving property in terms of the services that resources provide is
an important first step. The shift in perspective from things to streams makes
clear that owned objects or parcels—things—do not provide these services
on their own, but rather do so only in the presence of certain complementary
goods, services, and conditions. Because these complements are politically
mediated and highly contingent, the streams themselves must be understood
not as inherent incidents of ownership but rather as artifacts of collective
judgments. And these judgments, which determine how and to whom
resources can stream services, have important distributive consequences.
Recognizing that value comes from service streams rather than from
ownership alone carries a number of important implications that inform the
way property can approach inequality. First, owners can block and squander
service streams that otherwise might produce more value. The fact that these
streams are selectively fed and diverted by public choices makes them more
than a matter of private prerogative. Second, the inexorable pull of
ownership helps to explain not only why objects are allowed to stand in for
service streams in the popular imagination, but also why it might make sense
to frame service streams in ownership terms. Third, the resource services that
provide the most value to people shift and change over time. By focusing on
optimizing streams rather than allocating objects, property can prioritize the
reconfigurability necessary to advance human well-being.
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